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The Duty to Think Strategically 
Nadelle Grossman∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Under Delaware corporate law, directors and officers have a 
duty to oversee their firm’s management of risk to limit losses. 
Corporate law does not, however, require directors or officers to 
oversee their firm’s management of strategy to create gains. Yet, 
managing both risk and strategy is essential to a firm in creating 
value. In fact, as I argue in the Article, the current focus by courts 
and commentators only on risk management to prevent losses 
could actually undermine a firm’s management of its strategy for 
gains. I therefore propose a model for how Delaware corporate law 
can drive firms to manage their strategies for gains, in addition to 
their risk of loss, all to create value. 
 This proposal is especially necessary in light of the fact that 
companies such as General Motors collapsed not because of 
excessive risk taking, but because they failed to sufficiently 
formulate and implement innovative strategies for gains. This 
proposal also opens an additional avenue to combat the significant 
problem of short-termism, or the drive by firms to create short-
term profits regardless of whether that creates true value. It 
combats short-termism by creating an expectation for officers and 
directors to oversee their firm’s formulation and implementation of 
value-creating strategic objectives. Those objectives, rather than 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For decades, General Motors (GM) was a pillar of strength 
among U.S. public companies. Not only was it among the three 
largest public companies in the United States from 1955 until its 




bankruptcy in 2008,1 but for 77 years it was the largest automaker 
in the world.2 
Despite GM’s success, monsters lay beneath the surface. For 
years, GM failed to produce smaller, safer, more fuel-efficient 
vehicles in response to changing demand.3 As a result, it 
increasingly lost market share to foreign competitors over the 
course of three decades.4 GM also lagged behind its foreign 
competitors in standardizing its manufacturing processes and the 
platforms, body architectures, and components that it used to 
manufacture its vehicles.5 Without such standardization, GM not 
only faced substantially higher manufacturing costs, but it also 
lacked the manufacturing flexibility to respond to changes in 
demand.6 
These failures left GM flat-footed when the financial crisis 
struck in 2007–2008. Ultimately GM, together with Chrysler, 
received roughly $80 billion in federal financial assistance at the 
time of the crisis,7 and GM was forced to file for bankruptcy 
protection to restructure its business in a way that would enable it 
to compete in the future.8 
While we may never know the true causes of GM’s collapse, 
one factor in that collapse appears to be flaws in GM’s process for 
managing its strategy. For example, numerous auto industry 
experts have found that GM formulated its strategy for the creation 
of gains on the basis of unrealistic assumptions about its 
competitive environment.9 Even the Presidential Task Force on the 
Auto Industry, formed to investigate the causes of GM’s and 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Fortune 500: A Database of 50 Years of Fortune’s List of America’s 
Largest Corporations, CNN.COM, http://money.cnn.com/magazines /fortune 
/fortune500archive/full/1998/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
 2. See BILL CANIS & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE 
U.S. MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY: CONFRONTING A NEW DYNAMIC IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 43 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc 
/R41154.pdf. 
 3. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 4. See OBAMA ADMINISTRATION, DETERMINATION OF VIABILITY 
SUMMARY: GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION (2009) [hereinafter GM 
VIABILITY SUMMARY], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets 
/documents/GMViabilityAssessmentFINAL.pdf.  
 5. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 6. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 7. See CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JANUARY OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN 
UPDATE ON TARP SUPPORT FOR THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 18 
(2011), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010325/ 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-011311-report.pdf. 
 8. Neil King, Jr., & Sheila Terlep, GM Collapses into Government’s Arms, 
WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A1. 
 9. See infra Part II.A.1. 




Chrysler’s collapses, found that GM’s restructuring plan, which set 
out GM’s strategy for future gains following its bankruptcy 
restructuring, was created on the basis of unrealistic assumptions 
about GM’s market share and pricing power.10  
These unrealistic assumptions show flaws in GM’s process for 
formulating its strategy. That is because strategic planners must 
make realistic assumptions, on the basis of all available 
information, about a firm’s competitive environment if their 
strategy is going to effectively lay out a road-map for that firm’s 
competitive survival.11 A strategy that fails to reflect realistic 
assumptions about the future is not worth the paper on which it is 
written. 
On top of these planning deficiencies, GM historically failed to 
implement the strategy that it had formulated.12 Thus, any benefits 
that GM would have derived from having formulated a strategy 
were lost. 
These flaws in GM’s strategic management processes are not 
aberrational. In fact, numerous business commentators have 
identified the failure to maintain a current strategy and to 
implement the selected strategy as common causes for firms’ 
collapses.13 Ultimately, these flaws undermine a firm’s ability to 
generate value, for a firm can only hope to create sustained value 
in a market economy if it has a realistic, forward-looking strategic 
plan and if it effectively and efficiently implements that plan 
through its employees’ decisions and tasks.14 
Creating value also requires a firm to engage in the 
complementary process of managing its risks.15 That is because 
while a strategic plan sets out a plan for a firm to remain 
competitive into the future, the future is uncertain and therefore 
risky.16 Because of risk, a firm faces the prospect that it will not 
generate the value that it expects from its strategic plan. Firms try 
                                                                                                             
 10. See infra Part II.A.1. The task force was comprised of members from 
the Department of Treasury, National Economic Council, Council of Economic 
Advisors, and the other Cabinet agencies involved in the President’s Task Force 
on the Auto Industry, as well as individuals at industry-leading consulting, 
financial advisory and law firms. GM VIABILITY SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 2. 
This group also consulted with outside experts and affected stakeholders. Id. 
 11. See FRED R. DAVID, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND CASES 
79 (13th ed. 2011) (“Planning would be impossible without assumptions. . . . 
Wild guesses should never be made in formulating strategies, but reasonable 
assumptions based on available information must always be made.”). 
 12. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 




to control for these decreases in expected value by managing their 
risks.17 So, for example, a firm might purchase flood insurance to 
transfer the risk of a flood destroying its income-producing 
property to a third-party insurer. In this way, managing risk 
increases a firm’s ability to generate gains from its strategy. 
Despite the integral relationship between processes to manage 
both value-creating strategic plans and risk, lawmakers have only 
focused on fixing flaws in risk-management processes. This is 
particularly true since the financial crisis struck, where faulty risk-
management processes are thought to have paved the way for the 
excessive risk taking that lay at the heart of the crisis.18 However, 
those legal measures completely ignore the flaws that exist in the 
related strategic-management processes, which also impair a firm’s 
ability to create value. Most troubling, state corporate law imposes 
no clear duty on officers or directors to oversee the management of 
a firm’s strategy to create gains akin to the duty state corporate law 
imposes on officers and directors to oversee a firm’s management 
of risk. 
Some might respond that corporate law does not need to 
impose any duty on officers or directors to oversee the 
management of strategy to create gains because officers already 
have incentives––in the form of stock options and other kinds of 
incentive compensation––to create gains and thus to implement 
processes to achieve that end. However, incentive compensation 
often motivates officers to generate gains over the short term rather 
than true, sustained value.19 Yet, a firm ultimately benefits from 
                                                                                                             
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission Releases Report on the Causes of the Financial Crisis (Jan. 
27, 2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdnmedia/fcic-news 
/2011-0127-fcic-releases-report.pdf (listing as one of the five identified causes 
of the financial crisis “[d]ramatic breakdowns in corporate governance including 
too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk”); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 967, 968 (2009) (“The financial crisis of 2008 revealed serious risk 
management failures on an almost systemic basis throughout the business 
community. Shareholder losses attributable to absent or poorly implemented risk 
management programs likely are enormous.”); Robert T. Miller, Oversight 
Liability for Risk-Management Failures at Financial Firms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 
47, 50 (2010) (“Many people think that excessive risk taking by major financial 
institutions was an important cause of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, and, 
consequently, that there were significant failures of risk-management systems at 
such firms.”). 
 19. Nadelle Grossman, Turning a Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term 
Commitment: Board Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 905, 932 
(2010) [hereinafter Grossman, Short-Term Fling]. The disconnect between 
compensation and the creation of true value also explains why financial 




value that is sustained.20 Thus, financial incentives do not 
necessarily ensure that officers manage a firm’s strategic plan to 
create gains. 
To address the disconnect in corporate law between the 
management of risk and the management of strategy, I propose that 
the Delaware courts create an expectation on officers and directors 
to oversee not only their firm’s risk-management system but also 
its strategic-management system. In that way, fiduciary duties will 
better guide officers and directors as to what it means to act in a 
corporation’s best interest in an ongoing business context apart 
from merely attempting to prevent losses through the management 
of risk. 
This Article is the first in the legal field to tackle in any depth 
the management of value-creating processes apart from risk 
management. For example, since GM’s strategic troubles initially 
surfaced, numerous commentators have articulated proposals 
designed to improve firms’ processes to manage risk.21 However, 
none of those proposals addresses in any depth the need for firms 
to create value through the related process of managing a firm’s 
strategy for the creation of gains.22 My Article therefore fills a 
significant gap in the legal literature and in the law in terms of 
corporate processes to create value. 
                                                                                                             
 
incentives do not adequately deter excessive risk taking, for losses from 
excessive risk taking are generally only realized over time, after compensation 
has been paid. See id. at 940. 
 20. Id. at 941. 
 21. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 985–90; Michelle M. Harner, 
Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in 
the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 57–58 (2010); Eric J. Pan, 
Rethinking the Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware 
Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 218 (2011) [hereinafter Pan, Rethinking 
the Board’s Duty]; Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk 
Management and Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 591–94 
(2008); J. Robert Brown, Delaware Courts and Exonerating the Board from 
Supervising Risk: In re Citigroup Derivative Litigation (Introduction), 
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Mar. 12, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.theraceto 
thebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delaware-courts-and-exonerating-
the-board-from-supervising-r-4.html. 
 22. While Professor Bainbridge does mention the strategic-management 
context for risk management, his proposal is focused solely on curbing excessive 
risk taking without contemplating how that impacts the broader management of 
strategy. Bainbridge, supra note 18, at 985–90. Professor Pan also describes the 
board’s supervisory and advisory roles in the management of corporate strategy. 
See Pan, Rethinking the Board’s Duty, supra note 21, at 218. However, his 
proposal likewise focuses only on creating a more robust duty to monitor 
business risk, without focusing on the other aspects of strategy. See id. at 241. 




My proposal also opens up an additional avenue for courts to 
combat the significant problem of short-termism, or the drive by 
firms to create short-term earnings regardless of whether that 
creates true value.23 If officers and directors were expected to 
manage their firm’s strategy, they would need to put in place 
processes to ensure their firm has a long-term value-creating 
strategic plan to fulfill that expectation. As such, that strategic 
plan, rather than such short-term indicia as next quarter’s earnings 
targets, would be expected to guide employee conduct. 
This Article proceeds as follows: First, Part II explains the 
different stages and considerations involved in strategic 
management. It also highlights the relationship between strategic 
management and risk management in creating corporate value. 
Finally, that discussion explores the benefits of strategic 
management, as well as some of the challenges associated with the 
process. 
Part III then discusses current corporate law requirements for 
directors’ and officers’ management of strategy and risk. That 
discussion focuses on state corporate law, as that law sets out 
directors’ and officers’ duties to the firms that they serve. 
However, Part III also considers those federal securities laws and 
stock exchange governance rules that most directly impact 
directors’ and officers’ strategic- and risk-management duties. As 
that discussion shows, current law only obligates officers and 
directors to create value through implementing risk-management 
programs. It does not, however, impose any clear, coherent duty on 
officers or directors to create value through the implementation of 
a strategic-management system either as part of a standard of 
liability or even as a normative standard of conduct. 
Next, Part IV considers the consequences of the law’s failure to 
address the management of strategy apart from risk. I then propose 
some relatively modest shifts in corporate law with the goal of 
bringing about more effective strategic-management practices for 
the creation of value. Finally, Part V concludes. 
II. STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
This section explores what strategic management is. Given the 
absence of discussion of strategic management in legal literature, 
the bulk of this discussion has been derived from business 
                                                                                                             
 23. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the problem of short-termism and 
how strategic management combats that problem. 




commentary and other business sources.24 While that literature is 
substantial, it is often also conflicting. Nevertheless, I have 
attempted to cull a simplified picture of strategic management 
from those sources to animate a discussion of how strategic 
management impacts the corporate governance legal landscape. 
Strategic management refers generally to the process of 
managing a business in a way that maintains its competitiveness.25 
Remaining competitive is critical to a firm, for that is the only way 
that the firm can survive in a market economy and thus create 
sustained value. 
There are several different models firms can use to manage 
their strategies.26 For purposes of this discussion, I will examine a 
model that has three stages: First is the strategy formulation stage; 
second is the strategy implementation stage; and third is the 
                                                                                                             
 24. Other legal commentators who have written on aspects of strategic 
management have also cited to business authors as sources for strategic-
management concepts. See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, What’s Law Got to Do 
With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 587, 588 (2010) 
(relying on the work of Michael Porter and his five-forces model); Norman W. 
Hawker, What Do Business Schools Teach About Antitrust?: Antitrust Insights 
from Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 67, 85 (2003) (concluding 
that strategic management and related scholarship offer valuable insights into 
why corporations act as they do and provide a useful lens through which to 
understand how corporations react to legal concerns); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & 
Dennis A. Yao, Antitrust—What Role for Strategic Management Expertise?, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1458, 1464–68 (2010) (relying on the work of Michael 
Porter and other business academics to illustrate the link between antitrust law 
and strategic management). 
 25. JAY B. BARNEY, GAINING AND SUSTAINING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
6–7 (2d ed. 2002); DAVID, supra note 11, at 6; TONY MORDEN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO BUSINESS STRATEGY 2–3 (2d ed. 1999). See also Rajiv Nag 
et al., What Is Strategic Management, Really? Inductive Derivation of a 
Consensus Definition of the Field, 28 STRAT. MGMT. J. 935, 942–44 (2007) 
(concluding, based on a survey of strategic-management scholars, that strategic 
management is a field that deals with (a) the major intended and emergent 
initiatives (b) taken by general managers on behalf of owners (c) involving 
utilization of resources (d) to enhance the performance (e) of firms (f) in their 
external environments). But see HENRY MINTZBERG ET AL., STRATEGY SAFARI: 
A GUIDED TOUR THROUGH THE WILDS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT passim 
(1998) (explaining the ten different schools of thought as to strategic 
management). 
 26. DAVID, supra note 11, at 14–15. See, e.g., ARTHUR A. THOMPSON, JR., 
ET AL., CRAFTING AND EXECUTING STRATEGY: THE QUEST FOR COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE 24 (17th ed. 2010) (describing the tasks of strategic management as 
developing strategic vision and business mission; setting objectives and creating 
strategy to achieve those objectives; implementing and executing strategy; 
evaluating performance; and reviewing and implementing corrections). 




strategy evaluation and revision stage.27 Section A reviews each of 
these stages. 
The overall goal of managing a firm’s strategy is to create an 
enterprise that is competitive and, as such, continues to generate 
value. This and other virtues of strategic management are 
discussed in Section B. Section B also discusses some drawbacks 
to the strategic management process. 
A. Stages of Strategic Management 
This discussion explains the primary stages in the process of 
strategic management. First, Subsection 1 discusses the strategy-
formulation stage. That discussion not only looks at the 
formulation of a firm’s strategy, but it also examines the 
formulation of a firm’s mission, which serves as the foundation for 
its strategy, as well as the formulation of objectives, which serve as 
the long-term goals that a firm’s strategy is designed to achieve. 
Together, a firm’s mission, objectives, and strategy are referred to 
as its strategic plan.28 Then Subsection 2 discusses the strategy-
implementation stage. Subsection 3 next discusses the strategy-
evaluation and -revision stage. Finally, Subsection 4 explores the 
board’s role with respect to this strategic-management process. 
1. Strategy Formulation  
Because firms exist to generate value,29 the goal of strategic 
planners is to create a strategic plan for a firm to remain 
                                                                                                             
 27. These stages are generally consistent with the stages identified by a 
number of business commentators. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 11, at 15 
(depicting graphically the stages of strategic management as the strategy-
formulation stage, the strategy-implementation stage, and the strategy-
evaluation stage); THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 24 (describing the 
tasks of strategic management as developing strategic vision and business 
mission; setting objectives and creating strategy to achieve those objectives; 
implementing and executing strategy; evaluating performance; and reviewing 
and implementing corrections). 
 28. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 41. 
 29. See ROBERT R. MOELLER, COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: 
UNDERSTANDING THE NEW INTEGRATED ERM FRAMEWORK 48 (2007); Antony 
Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 979, 986 (2009) (“Whether one supports the concession-theory or 
contract view of a corporation, the ultimate ends of a corporation should 
invariably be the pursuit of aggregate social welfare and the interests of society 
as a whole.”). Some commentators describe the purpose of the firm as the 
maximization of value, or wealth. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. 
Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the 
Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 146 (2008) (“Both sides [referring to 




competitive into the future. Only if a firm survives into the future 
can it hope to generate value beyond current orders and 
prospects.30 
The foundation of that plan is known as its mission.31 More 
specifically, a firm’s mission explains why the firm exists.32 In 
addition to revealing a firm’s core values, a firm’s mission often 
serves a motivational purpose.33 By telling employees what the 
ultimate goal of their efforts is, they can see how their tasks fit into 
the firm’s grand scheme. However, a mission is not designed to 
provide discrete operational goals.34 Objectives, rather, serve that 
purpose.35 
A firm’s objectives are the qualitative and quantitative goals 
toward which all resources and efforts are to be devoted, usually 
over the next five years or so.36 While some objectives are 
financial, others are more market based (for example, objectives 
tied to a firm’s market share).37 A firm may also have operational 
objectives, compliance objectives, or reporting objectives.38 While 
some of these objectives are primarily within a firm’s control (e.g., 
compliance and reporting objectives), others depend to a greater 
                                                                                                             
 
shareholder primacists and director primacists] claim wealth maximization for 
the firm as the purpose in view.”). 
 30. For this reason, a firm’s true value is usually determined by the 
discounted value of its estimated future cash flows. RICHARD A. BREALEY & 
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 27–28 (1996). 
 31. DAVID, supra note 11, at 44. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 47–50. 
 34. GARTH SALONER ET AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 24 (2001). 
 35. MOELLER, supra note 29, at 62. 
 36. MORDEN, supra note 25, at 112–13. See also PAUL FIFIELD, MARKETING 
STRATEGY: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MARKETING AND MARKETS 18 (3d ed. 
2007) (“Managers generally believe that their (and any) market becomes 
unpredictable beyond five years, so it is pointless (academic) looking out any 
further.”). Still, depending on a firm’s industry, product life-cycle, and other 
factors, a firm might plan for either a shorter or longer period. For example, 
Brown-Forman Corp., manufacturer of spirits such as Jack Daniels whiskey, has 
a ten-year strategic plan. Brown-Forman Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 
20 (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data 
/14693/000119312512285018/0001193125-12-285018-index.htm.  
 37. See THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 33–34. 
 38. See THE COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE 
TREADWAY COMMISSION (COSO), ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 20–21, 36–39 (2004) [hereinafter COSO ERM 
FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.drcia.org/old/UploadFiles/UploadFiles 
1882/200804/20080415101610532.pdf; GREGORY MONAHAN, ENTERPRISE RISK 
MANAGEMENT: A METHODOLOGY FOR ACHIEVING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 13–
21 (2008). 




extent on factors beyond the firm’s control (e.g., financial and 
market objectives).39 
Setting objectives that are clearly articulated and challenging 
but achievable is essential to a firm; it causes those who manage a 
firm to have a clear and widely understood set of goals as to where 
the firm will be over the time period covered by those objectives.40 
That, in turn, guards against a firm’s simply drifting along without 
any clear direction to guide its decisions.41 That is especially risky 
in a competitive environment, where a period of complacency or 
drift could place that firm behind its competitors.42 Moreover, a 
firm can track its progress against its objectives.43 Thus, objectives 
give firms outcomes against which the firms can measure and 
evaluate their performance. Employee compensation can also be 
tied to the achievement of those objectives.44 
Objectives do not, however, tell a firm’s employees how to 
achieve those goals.45 Rather, a strategy serves that purpose. 
Specifically, a strategy details how, functionally, a firm plans to 
achieve its objectives.46 A strategy lays out the concrete procedures 
and assignable responsibilities for achieving a firm’s objectives.47 
So, for example, a strategy guides decisions such as which 
products to develop or manufacture and which market segments to 
pursue in an attempt to achieve the firm’s objectives.48 
The key to creating an effective strategic plan is ensuring that it 
reflects the firm’s competitive approach. In other words, the plan 
must reflect that firm’s competitive advantage, i.e., the quality that 
makes that firm unique compared to its competitors, leading to its 
hoped-for survival.49 There are a number of frameworks through 
                                                                                                             
 39. See COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 21 (distinguishing 
objectives relating to the reliability of reporting and compliance with law, which 
are within the entity’s control, from achievement of objectives, such as attaining 
a specific market share or successfully launching a new product line, which are 
not entirely within the entity’s control). 
 40. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 33. 
 41. See id. (noting that goals push organizations to be intentional and 
focused in their actions). 
 42. See id.; see also infra Part II.A.3. 
 43. See MORDEN, supra note 25, at 112–13; SALONER ET AL., supra note 34, 
at 10–12. 
 44. See DAVID, supra note 11, at 232. 
 45. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 6, 37 (noting that strategy 
making is all about the “how” and that it follows the setting of objectives). 
 46. DAVID, supra note 11, at 133–34. 
 47. See FIFIELD, supra note 36, at 94–96; MORDEN, supra note 25, at 113–14.  
 48. See THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 37. 
 49. DAVID, supra note 11, at 9; MORDEN, supra note 25, at 49 (“[If a 
corporation] has no source of competitive advantage it will not survive. . . . 
Adding value, and developing or sustaining competitive advantage are both 




which a firm can critically analyze the source of its competitive 
advantage. For example, under one framework, developed by 
leading strategic-management scholar Michael Porter, a firm’s 
competitive advantage stems from its position within its industry.50 
So, for instance, a company must be able to supply the same 
products to customers as its industry peers but at a lower cost––
translated into a lower price––to compete.51 Or it must be able to 
supply its customers with a unique product that its competitors do 
not provide, or focus on a specific target-market, to remain 
competitive.52 Under another framework advanced by Gary Hamel 
and C.K. Prahalad, a firm’s competitive advantage is based 
primarily on the firm’s unique competencies.53 For example, a 
firm’s competitive advantage might stem from its unique technical 
know-how or a uniquely reliable process.54 
In addition to identifying its competitive advantage, planners 
must also identify and analyze a firm’s source or sources of 
weakness, or what the company does poorly compared to its 
competitors.55 If any such weakness makes a firm competitively 
susceptible, that firm might need to correct for that weakness to be 
able to compete.56 
However, a firm is limited in what it can achieve by leveraging 
its competitive advantage, even despite its weaknesses. These 
limits are sometimes referred to as constraints.57 Internally, a firm 
is constrained by its resources, competencies, skills and operational 
                                                                                                             
 
critical to enterprise survival in competitive markets.”); SALONER ET AL., supra 
note 34, at 40. But see MANUEL BECERRA, THEORY OF THE FIRM FOR STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT: ECONOMIC VALUE ANALYSIS 130–31 (2009) (stating that 
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imitation. See id. at 13–14, 112. 
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32 (1994). 
 54. FIFIELD, supra note 36, at 105.  
 55. THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 111. 
 56. See id. at 115. 
 57. See, e.g., MORDEN, supra note 25, at 5. 




capabilities.58 Some business commentators view shareholder 
demands for returns as an internal constraint on the basis that 
shareholders do not set a firm’s ultimate business objectives, but 
rather have a quasi-contractual interest that must be served as a 
condition to their continued financial support for the firm.59 
External constraints, such as customer demand, social and 
environmental forces, competitive environment, and contractual 
commitments to external market actors, also limit what a firm can 
achieve with its competitive advantage.60 Moreover, the law limits 
what a business can––and cannot––do with its competitive 
advantage and resources.61 An effective strategic plan must not 
only lay out a path for competitiveness in light of that firm’s 
uniqueness, but must also reflect these constraints, which limit 
what the firm can achieve. 
Still, a firm cannot be assured of success even after factoring in 
its constraints because the future in which the firm operates is 
unknown and therefore uncertain.62 Strategic-management 
processes seek to anticipate and respond to this uncertainty, which 
might either involve a potential future threat (i.e., risk) or potential 
future opportunity.  
Broadly speaking, risk is the potential for an outcome to 
deviate from what is expected.63 In the context of business, risk 
can cause a firm to generate a much lower level of returns than 
expected or can even cause a firm to generate a loss. For example, 
by holding over $43 billion worth of mortgage-related assets,64 
Citigroup was exposed to significant credit risk if the 
creditworthiness of the borrowers on the debt contracts underlying 
those mortgages deteriorated. When the housing market collapsed 
and borrowers on such debt contracts defaulted en masse, 
Citigroup suffered major losses. In fact, more than half of 
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EXPOSITION 8–10 (1985). 
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Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 901 (2011). 
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Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23citi.html. 




Citigroup’s $65 billion losses are thought to stem from its 
mortgage-related assets.65 
Risk, at least in theory, captures future events and 
circumstances that might yield greater returns than expected in 
addition to those that might yield lesser returns.66 Despite that, 
commentators and policymakers typically use the term risk only in 
its down-side sense, referring to risks that might cause results to be 
lower than expected.67 For that reason, I use the term risk in this 
Article exclusively in its down-side sense and use the term 
opportunity to refer to up-side risk. 
Still, even risk is not necessarily bad. In fact, our economy is 
built on the notion that businesses will take risks that might lead to 
great gains––but that might also lead to losses.68 However, firms 
“manage” their risks in an attempt to limit unexpected downward 
swings in returns. 
Managing risk at the strategic-planning phase involves first 
identifying the possible risks that might surface that could cause 
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 66. See Simkins & Ramirez, supra note 21, at 577 (tracing the etymology of 
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 67. See, e.g., CROUHY ET AL., supra note 63, at 4–8 (giving examples of risk 
that only involve loss or the potential for loss); MORDEN, supra note 25, at 211 
(explaining risk in terms of actual or potential loss); Michelle M. Harner, 
Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323, 1328–29 
& n.17 (2010) (adopting the dictionary definition of risk, which is “the 
possibility of loss or injury,” though expanding on that definition to include the 
consequences of that loss). The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO), a private organization sponsored by a number 
of professional accounting organizations that influences frameworks for the 
implementation of accounting standards, has drawn a similar distinction between 
risks and opportunities. See COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 16 
(defining risk as “the possibility that an event will occur and adversely affect the 
achievement of objectives” and opportunity as “the possibility that an event will 
occur and positively affect the achievement of objectives”). Nevertheless, the 
COSO ERM Framework, discussed infra in this Part II.A.1, contemplates 
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 68. See ASWATH DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A FRAMEWORK 
FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 8–9 (2008) (stating that “increasing exposures to some 
risk is an integral part of success” and that successful companies take calculated 
risks); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction 
to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 641 (2003) (explaining that investors 
like returns but dislike risk and that “there is an inverse relationship between the 
two”); E. Norman Veasey, The Challenges for Directors in Piloting Through 
State and Federal Standards in the Maelstrom of Risk Management, 34 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (“Because the taking of prudent risks is inherently the 
engine of corporate profit maximization, a risk-taking strategy is important.”). 




the firm to generate lower returns than expected.69 Next, planners 
measure those risks by considering the probability of each of those 
outcomes.70 Finally, planners consider whether and how to respond 
to each risk should it occur, such as by eliminating the risk or 
mitigating the down-side effect of the risk.71 One way to eliminate 
risk, for example, is to refrain from the risky conduct.72 Ways of 
mitigating the down-side effects of risk include sharing or 
transferring the risk to a third party through hedging or insurance73 
and preventative and responsive internal control measures.74 Of 
course, planners may also decide that it does not pay to reduce or 
eliminate risk and engage in the risky conduct nonetheless.75 
Ultimately, risk management at the strategy-formulation stage 
helps planners both set objectives as well as select the strategy that 
they expect will achieve those objectives. It helps planners select 
strategy because they can select the strategy that they believe is 
likely to generate the highest level of “risk-adjusted” returns within 
the firm’s desired risk appetite and tolerance level.76 That level of 
risk-adjusted returns, then, can become one of the firm’s financial 
objectives. Thus, managing risk is critical to a firm’s management 
of its strategy, even though selecting a strategic plan calls for more 
than identifying, measuring, and planning a response to risk. 
Firms vary in the approach they take to managing risk, which 
impacts the setting of strategic plans and other stages of strategic 
management. Some firms take what is referred to as the silo 
approach, where they approach different kinds of risk in separate 
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ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 19; MOELLER, supra note 29, at 51. Risk 
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and non-integrated silos apart from other kinds of risk.77 Moreover, 
different organizational units within a firm might approach risk 
separately from other units.78 For example, a firm’s credit group 
might manage credit risk, and its IT group might manage the risk 
from a disruption in the continuity of IT systems (such as IT credit 
systems), but there may not be any communication or coordination 
between these groups.79 
One of the biggest concerns with the silo approach at the 
strategy-formulation stage is that no one at the firm is deciding on 
an appropriate enterprise-wide risk appetite or risk tolerance when 
formulating a firm’s strategy.80 The silo approach also could lead 
to the failure to appreciate cross effects of risk between 
organizational units as well as kinds of risk.81 For these reasons, 
the silo approach is thought to lead to the management of risk in an 
ad hoc, informal, and uncoordinated way.82 
These concerns were the primary driving force behind the 
alternate approach to risk management referred to as enterprise risk 
management, or ERM.83 According to the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), 
a private organization sponsored by a number of professional 
accounting organizations that has promulgated the leading ERM 
framework,84 ERM is an integrated, holistic, process-oriented 
approach to managing risks, including at the strategy-setting stage, 
with the intent of maximizing value for the enterprise.85 
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 83. See JAMES W. DELOACH, ENTERPRISE-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT: 
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 85. DELOACH, supra note 83, at xiii; MOELLER, supra note 29, at 3. ERM is 
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DELOACH, supra note 83, at xiii; FRIGO & ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 1; 
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at 81, 83, 85. Thus, the focus is not on managing specific kinds of risks (such as 




While many commentators point to ERM as the future of risk 
management,86 the ERM movement is still nascent.87 In fact, 
according to a study conducted on behalf of COSO, 60% of the 
respondents indicated that their firms’ processes for tracking risks 
were informal and ad hoc, or tracked within individual business 
silos rather than on an enterprise-wide basis.88 
Even if the ERM movement gains traction, its focus is on the 
creation of value through better risk-management processes. 
However, it does not focus on processes to create value apart from 
managing risk, such as through the management of strategy.89 Yet, 
because ERM’s primary purpose is to help a firm create value,90 
the process is integrally related with strategic-management 
processes.91 
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 89. See COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 38, at 14 (noting that 
management’s choice as to objectives and the allocation of resources, 
presumably to implement strategy, are not part of ERM). 
 90. See id. at 5–6 (“Enterprise risk management ensures that management 
has in place a process to set objectives and that the chosen objectives support 
and align with the entity’s mission and are consistent with its risk appetite.”). 
 91. See Enterprise Risk Management: Current Initiatives and Issues: Journal 
of Applied Finance Roundtable, 18 J. APPLIED FIN., no. 1, 2008 at 115 
(interviewing Todd Perkins, the Chief Risk Officer of Southern Company, one of 
the largest utilities in the Southeastern U.S., who explained that Southern 
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The momentum behind ERM is confined to the risk-
management field. In other words, there is no similar 
comprehensive framework that firms are encouraged to adopt in 
strategy selection. However, there does seem to be some consensus 
that firms should take a bottom-up approach to the formulation of 
strategic plans for value creation.92 Thus, lower level managers and 
employees formulate objectives and strategy, at least at the 
divisional and operational levels, and actively participate in the 
setting of overall corporate objectives and strategy by the firm’s 
officers.93 This sort of participation by employees and lower level 
managers in setting strategy not only allows those managers and 
employees to better understand what the firm is doing and why, but 
it also enhances their commitment to helping the firm achieve its 
objectives.94 Nevertheless, strategic-management scholars stress 
the need for firms to take a balanced approach to the formulation 
of strategic plans and adopt one that is deemed best for that 
particular firm.95  
For an example of what happens when strategic-planning 
efforts go awry, consider the case of GM. While Roger Smith 
emphasized the need for strategic planning during his tenure as 
GM’s CEO throughout the 1980s,96 according to Maryann Keller, 
a financial analyst for the automobile industry who has extensively 
studied GM, GM’s process did not allow for the introduction of 
new ideas, which were perceived as a challenge to the existing way 
of doing things.97 That mentality would have undermined GM’s 
strategic-planning efforts, for it is hard to imagine creating 
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innovative plans for the creation of gains where creative thought is 
stymied. 
Moreover, Keller found that GM’s strategic-planning process 
relied upon numerous unrealistic assumptions. For example, for 
years GM assumed that foreign competitors were simply temporary 
opportunists who got lucky in the oil crisis, rather than long-term 
competitors who built better cars.98 It also assumed that customers 
would be loyal to GM regardless of the quality of its products or 
changing competitive environment.99 Such assumptions would have 
undermined GM’s strategic-planning process because that process 
depends on the making of reasonable assumptions based on 
available information.100 Without such reasonable assumptions, the 
planning process simply cannot proceed effectively.101 
The Obama Administration’s auto task force, formed to 
investigate the causes of GM’s and Chrysler’s collapses,102 also 
found that GM made unrealistic assumptions in its planning 
efforts. For example, it found that GM’s assumption as to its 
projected future market share was too optimistic in light of the fact 
that it had been losing market share to competitors for decades.103 
The auto task force also found that GM’s assumption about 
product price increases was too optimistic in light of a severely 
distressed market, lingering quality perceptions and an increase in 
smaller vehicles, where GM has historically made lower profit 
margins.104 Once again, these unrealistic assumptions reveal flaws 
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in GM’s planning process and help explain why GM’s strategic 
plan failed to set out a realistic plan for its competitive survival.105 
The Obama auto task force also found that GM’s restructuring 
plan failed to show how the company would remain competitively 
viable.106 This deficiency also demonstrates that GM’s strategic-
planning process was flawed, for surely an effective process for 
formulating a strategy––whether or not in the face of a 
restructuring––should ensure that the plan on its face appears to 
achieve the purpose for which it was designed: to create a plan for a 
firm’s competitive survival.107 
2. Strategy Implementation 
Once a firm’s strategic plan has been formulated, the strategy 
included within that plan must then be implemented by everyone 
within the enterprise to assure that the business choices made in 
the strategy are carried out through day-to-day decisions and 
tasks.108 Effective implementation means that resources within a 
firm are efficiently deployed, and tasks carried out, to implement 
that plan.109 Successful strategy implementation also requires 
developing a strategy-supportive culture and organizational 
structure.110 
Managers at all levels often take the lead in the implementation 
of strategy, for it is the employees whom they oversee who carry 
out the day-to-day implementing decisions and tasks.111 For that 
reason, it is often essential that a firm’s strategic plan be clearly 
communicated to the employees tasked with carrying it out.112 Not 
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 109. See id. at 213; THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 42 (listing out 
the principal steps in the process of strategy execution). 
 110. See THOMPSON, JR., ET AL., supra note 26, at 42. 
 111. DAVID, supra note 11, at 215. 
 112. ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, THE EXECUTION PREMIUM: 
LINKING STRATEGY TO OPERATIONS FOR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 3–6 (2008) 




only does this ensure that those employees understand where the 
firm is going so that they can help it get there, but it also helps 
them identify, and, in turn, communicate to top managers, where 
the firm skips its strategic track.113 
Many firms use what is known as the Balanced Scorecard 
(BSC) as a framework to guide their implementation of strategy.114 
The BSC is a strategic-planning and -management system designed 
to translate a firm’s strategic plan into specific business 
activities.115 It also gives firms a framework to evaluate how well 
their implementation efforts achieve the firm’s financial and non-
financial objectives.116 
Similar to ERM’s approach to risk management, the BSC takes 
a holistic approach to strategy by looking at strategy from the four 
perspectives from which an enterprise creates value: the financial, 
customer, internal business process, and learning and growth 
perspectives.117 Also similar to ERM, the BSC promotes an 
integrated approach to strategy implementation. It does that by 
providing a shared framework that allows all participants to see 
how their individual activities contribute to achieving the firm’s 
goals.118 Thus, like ERM, the BSC prevents silos from cutting off 
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communication and coordination among business and operating 
units in the implementation of strategy.119 
Despite its apparent merits, results are mixed as to whether the 
BSC improves results.120 Perhaps that explains why so many 
commentators have cited strategy implementation as firms’ 
primary challenge. For example, according to Larry Bossidy, 
former Chief Operating Officer of General Electric and CEO of 
Honeywell, and Ram Charan, well-known author and business 
advisor, the absence of strategy execution is the biggest obstacle to 
a firm’s success.121 Professors Kaplan and Norton, founders of the 
BSC, also recently concluded that most firms still struggle with 
implementing their strategies.122 As a result, firms only realize a 
fraction of the financial performance from their strategic plans.123 
Thus, neither the BSC nor any other strategy implementation 
framework has the kind of momentum behind it that ERM efforts 
currently have in the context of risk management. 
GM once again exemplifies a company whose progress was 
likely impaired by its failure to implement its strategy. In fact, 
according to Keller, despite GM’s focus in the early 1980s on 
strategic planning, GM’s strategies ended up on executives’ 
shelves gathering dust rather than in action.124 Thus, the virtues 
behind its having a strategy for the creation of gains were lost. 
3. Strategy Evaluation and Revision 
Once a firm has implemented a strategy for a period of time, it 
can assess whether or not that plan is indeed leading it on a path 
toward achieving its objectives and thus creating value for the firm 
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system made success two to three times as likely as did not having such a 
system”). 
 124. See KELLER, supra note 96, at 109. 




and its constituents. If it turns out that a strategy is not effectively 
driving toward firm objectives, that strategy (or those objectives) 
must be revised so that the strategy furthers the objectives. 
One of the primary challenges in evaluating the success of a 
strategy is the lack of information with which a firm can measure 
achievement of nonfinancial objectives. In fact, the authors of one 
study found that despite numerous financial firms having identified 
nonfinancial factors as key drivers of their creation of value, those 
firms generally used low-quality performance measures to track 
the success of those factors.125 Because those drivers of firm value 
are reflected in a firm’s objectives,126 firms often do not have 
adequate measures in place to determine whether they have 
achieved their nonfinancial objectives through implementing their 
strategies. 
Moreover, new risks and opportunities continually arise, and 
the probabilities of previously identified risks and opportunities 
change. In addition, a firm may develop a different strength, its 
competitive landscape may change, and other determinants of a 
firm’s strategy might change. Firms must ensure that these changes 
are not only identified but also communicated by employees to the 
appropriate people so that those people can decide whether or not 
an alteration in the firm’s strategy or objectives, or both, is in 
order.127 They can also decide whether a change in the allocation 
of resources is needed. 
Ideally, a firm communicates these changed circumstances to 
the planners who are responsible for formulating its strategic 
plan.128 Those planners can then decide whether or not a shift in 
strategy or objectives is warranted. The key, then, is to have 
adequate controls in place to catch such changes and to 
communicate them to those planners. 
While ERM controls are intended to serve this purpose as to 
new risks, and at least in the case of COSO’s ERM framework, 
new opportunities,129 the absence of systematic, robust, and 
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repeatable ERM systems suggests that companies do not have in 
place the controls they need to communicate such changes to the 
appropriate planners. In fact, in the COSO study mentioned above, 
organizational leaders at almost half of the responding 
organizations had either no, or only minimal, processes in place for 
identifying and monitoring emerging strategic risks.130 Moreover, 
an ERM system does not necessarily lay out a process through 
which a firm’s strategic plan is to be revised in light of such risks 
and opportunities––that process occurs as part of the strategic-
management process. 
If the factors upon which a firm’s strategic plan are based 
change and these changes are not reflected in that firm’s strategic 
plan, that firm may end up sticking with a strategic plan that is no 
longer optimal for generating value.131 In fact, business 
commentators widely identify continued adherence to the same 
stale strategy as one of the greatest management pitfalls.132 That, in 
turn, can undermine a firm’s ability to compete and, in turn, to 
generate value. 
GM’s strategic-planning process failures mentioned above 
likely explain why it ended up sticking with a stale strategy for so 
many years. For example, its assumption that foreign competitors 
were only temporarily in the U.S. market in the 1980s133 might 
explain why GM’s strategic plan repeatedly failed to call for the 
manufacture of smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles despite 
repeated surges in demand for those vehicles.134 Such an erroneous 
assumption about its competition might also explain why GM 
failed for some time to modernize its production processes to 
increase its operational efficiency.135 As a result of these strategic 
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missteps, GM lost market share over the course of three decades136 
and ultimately had to file for bankruptcy. Thus, GM demonstrates 
how a company can fail, or at least place itself in a precarious 
position, not because of excessive risk taking, but because of the 
systematic failure to critically assess its competitive landscape 
when creating its strategic plan. 
4. Board’s Role in Strategic Management 
The board plays a critical role in the strategic-management 
process. Specifically, boards supervise officers in managing that 
process.137 This role flows from the board’s function as the 
supervisory body over all corporate activities.138 
                                                                                                             
 
Motors, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1998, at 63, 63. However, most were ineffectual. 
See id. According to car industry expert James Harbour, GM began to improve 
its structure in 1994. HARBOUR, supra note 98, at 79–80. 
 136. See GM VIABILITY SUMMARY, supra note 4, at 3; see also Bill Vlasic & 
Andrew Ross Sorkin, G.M. and Chrysler Explore Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/business/11auto 
.html (stating that GM and Ford once “dominated the auto industry—until 
Japanese and other foreign car makers began making inroads into the American 
market” and that while “G.M. once commanded about 50 percent of the 
American vehicle market . . . its share so far this year [referring to 2008] has 
fallen to 22 percent”). 
 137. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO ET AL., THE CONFERENCE BD., INC., THE 
ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 6 
(2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=941179 
(“The full board clearly has oversight responsibility for strategy as well as 
ERM.”); DAVID LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MATTERS: A CLOSER LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR 
CONSEQUENCES 169 (2011) (stating that it is management’s––not the board’s––
job to develop strategy and that the board’s role is to scrutinize strategy to make 
sure that it is appropriate for stakeholders and then to monitor the contribution 
of corporate activities to the strategy); FRIGO & ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 1 
(“It is the board’s responsibility to ensure that management is devoting the right 
attention and resources to ERM and is setting the right tone for ERM.”). See 
also DAVID, supra note 11, at 200 (recommending that a board conduct an 
annual review of strategy much in the same fashion that it supervises an annual 
financial audit). 
 138. See Olson Bros., Inc. v. Englehart, 211 A.2d 610, 615 (Del. Ch. 
1965), aff’d, 245 A.2d 166 (Del. 1968); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
141(a) (Westlaw 2012) (“The business and affairs of every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a 
board of directors . . . .”). Officers, rather than directors, formulate strategy 
because they are generally more knowledgeable about firm resources, 
competitors, markets, customer demand, types of risks that are likely to 
occur and their likely impact, among other factors, given their day-to-day 
involvement in firm affairs. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 




Recently, commentators and policymakers have been 
clamoring for more board oversight over the management of 
risk.139 This undoubtedly flows from the financial crisis, which is 
widely believed to have been caused by inadequate risk-
management oversight.140 While oversight over the management of 
risk is consistent with the board’s role in overseeing processes 
through which firms create value, such oversight only focuses on 
one aspect of that role. However, it ignores the board’s role in 
overseeing processes to create value through strategic 
management. 
 Importantly, the board often also serves an advisory role in the 
formulation and revision of strategic plans for the creation of 
gains.141 In that capacity, the board provides advice and 
suggestions to officers as to which strategic plan to select. It is 
perhaps because of this role that some commentators depict the 
board as an active participant in the formulation of strategy.142 
Still, even where the board provides strategic advice, as a practical 
matter, and given their informational advantage, officers and their 
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subordinate managers, rather than directors, ultimately decide 
which wealth-creating strategy to pursue.143 
Boards also influence strategy through their selection of the 
CEO.144 That is because the CEO, given her position, is the top 
corporate strategist. By selecting a candidate who stands for a 
particular corporate strategy, the board effectively indicates which 
candidate’s corporate strategy it endorses.145 That is also true 
where a board creates a CEO succession plan; by deciding who is 
to take over upon the CEO’s departure, the board indicates which 
potential successor’s corporate strategy it agrees with.146 Thus, the 
board influences the strategic-management process through its 
selection of the CEO and her successor. 
B. Advantages (and Disadvantages) of Strategic Management 
It is clear that firms derive substantial value from managing 
their risks, for that process better ensures that firms realize value 
from their planned-for growth strategies by minimizing the adverse 
impact from risk-creating losses. However, there are numerous 
benefits that flow from deliberately managing a firm’s strategy for 
the creation of gains even apart from managing its risks. 
For one, strategic management allows an organization to 
formulate better strategic plans for the creation of gains through a 
more systematic, logical, and rational process.147 That, in turn, 
causes a firm’s managers to be more deliberate and deliberative in 
planning the firm’s future and, moreover, to exert more control 
over that firm’s destiny.148  
Strategic management also causes a firm’s managers to be 
more cognizant of the firm’s source of competitive strength and 
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weakness; resources, competitors, and other constraints; and 
opportunities. That, in turn, allows the firm’s managers to more 
appropriately reflect all of these inputs, as well as risk, when 
determining firm objectives and strategy. 
In addition, strategic management promotes coordinated 
activity within a firm, for it causes a firm to identify specific goals 
to be achieved, as well as a road-map for achieving those goals. 
Thus, employees are better able to understand to what ends their 
efforts are to be devoted and, as a result, do not pull the firm in all 
different directions with their various uncoordinated and 
undirected decisions and activities. Such coordination and 
communication can further augment employees’ commitment to 
the firm’s plan for the creation of value.149 
Perhaps one of the most compelling reasons for managing a 
firm’s strategy is that it combats managers’ incentive to manage 
for the short term.150 Short-termism refers to the undue focus by 
firms on short-term profits rather than the creation of true, 
sustained value.151 As I argued in a prior article, short-termism 
derives in part from the public disclosure of information that has a 
short-term bent, leading investors to over-value such disclosed 
short-term indicia and to under-value undisclosed drivers of long-
term value, such as a firm’s strategic plan for the creation of 
gains.152 Investor short-termism impacts the behavior of directors 
through shareholders’ exercise of voting and other powers.153 
Directors, being responsive to their electing shareholders, tie 
executive compensation to short-term performance metrics rather 
than the creation of true value.154 The end result is that firms 
under-invest in research and development and in new income-
producing assets, as the benefits from such investments are only 
realized over time.155 This, in turn, retards firms’ creation of true 
value.156 
Strategic management combats short-termism because it is a 
method of managing a firm to achieve predetermined, long-term 
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objectives for the creation of true value.157 Thus, managers at 
strategically managed firms are guided not by the next quarter’s 
expected results but by the firm’s plan for how to deploy its 
resources over time to achieve its wealth-creating objectives.158  
Managing a firm’s strategy generates a number of indirect 
benefits as well. One indirect benefit of strategic management is 
that a firm’s objectives can serve as a framework for the 
development of a CEO succession plan.159 Specifically, once 
strategists have formulated firm objectives under board 
supervision, the board can focus its succession planning efforts on 
finding an individual to best achieve those objectives upon the 
CEO’s departure.160 And by addressing this risk ex ante rather than 
after the CEO departs, a firm can better ensure the continuity of its 
existence and minimize the disruption that the transition to a new 
CEO has on its operations.  
Strategic management can also benefit executive compensation 
efforts. Specifically, a firm that engages in strategic management 
will have identified what its objectives are and will also have 
designed a strategy to achieve those objectives. Firms that have 
designed such objectives and strategies can then tie their 
executives’ compensation to successfully achieving those 
objectives and efficiently implementing those strategies.161 In fact, 
numerous commentators promote tying executives’ bonuses to 
such performance measures.162 
While there are undoubtedly other benefits to managing a 
firm’s strategy for the creation of gains, those mentioned above are 
some of the more salient ones. And they likely explain why 
numerous commentators have found that firms that use strategic-
management concepts are more successful, and more profitable, 
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than those who do not.163 Still, I would be remiss if I did not 
mention the disadvantages of strategic management. 
Perhaps the most apparent disadvantage of strategic 
management is that it requires the commitment of valuable time 
and energy, often of key executives and directors.164 Some 
managers must focus not on managing current operations, but on 
planning for the future. Still, over time, these costs should be 
outweighed by the benefits of having in place and implementing a 
carefully designed plan to create value. 
In addition, setting out on a predetermined path might give 
managers a false sense of confidence in the selected strategic 
direction, even causing them to put on blinders to new risks and 
opportunities.165 Moreover, a firm’s strategic plan for the creation 
of gains might become so embedded in its culture that managers 
simply cannot envision an alternate path.166 Of course, an effective 
planner might include, as part of the strategic-management 
process, a mechanism to prevent such moral or cultural attachment 
to any particular strategic plan. The board may also serve as a 
check on this kind of over-attachment to strategy, viewing the 
firm’s strategy for wealth creation from a more detached position. 
Thus, it is not clear that this challenge undermines the virtues of 
the strategic-management process. 
Finally, a firm might not realize the benefits of strategic 
management if it does not implement an effective and efficient 
process. For example, as was discussed above, firms are often 
ineffective at implementing their strategy.167 As a result, they are 
not able to effectively harness the powers of their firm’s 
competitive advantage, as provided in their strategic plan, to create 
gains.168 Moreover, a firm’s strategic plan may not be updated 
when changed circumstances necessitate the plan’s revision.169 The 
result is the continued implementation of a stale strategy that may 
undermine that firm’s ability to compete.170 
This last challenge describes the risks attendant to the 
mismanagement of strategy, rather than the management of 
strategy. Thus, it is not necessarily a pitfall of the process, but 
rather a pitfall of the process done poorly. Still, managers need to 
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be wary of these pitfalls, which can undermine the benefits of the 
strategic-management process, and should attempt to create a 
process that controls for such pitfalls to the extent possible. 
III. CORPORATE LAW STRATEGIC-MANAGEMENT DUTIES 
As I explained in Part II, to manage a firm’s strategy is to 
manage that firm in a way that is designed to maintain its 
competitiveness so that it can continue to thrive, and create value, 
in a changing environment. To be effective, a firm’s strategic plan 
must not only create a road map for its operation in light of that 
firm’s risks, but it must also reflect that firm’s competitive 
advantage (and weaknesses), its resources and other constraints, 
and its opportunities. In other words, while managing a firm’s risks 
is critical to its creation of value, that process alone does not create 
value––a firm creates value by also conducting the corollary 
process of formulating and implementing a well thought-out 
strategic plan for the creation of gains. Nevertheless, as this 
discussion shows, legal duties focus only on the management of 
risk to prevent losses and ignore the management of strategy for 
the creation of gains. 
This discussion begins, in Section A, by considering officers’ 
and directors’ duties under state corporate law to implement a 
strategic-management process at their firm. Because this Article 
focuses on strategic management in an ongoing business, that 
discussion does not focus on officers’ or directors’ duties in the 
takeover context. That is not to say that selling a business is not an 
important strategic decision––it is one of the most important 
strategic decisions that can be made with respect to a firm, for it 
could lead to the firm’s disappearance or continuance in an entirely 
different form. But this Article is focused on the context where a 
firm formulates and implements a strategic plan for the creation of 
gains through means other than such fundamental transactions. 
Moreover, this discussion looks only at Delaware law because 
most public companies are incorporated in Delaware.171 In 
addition, Delaware law is often followed or looked to for guidance 
in other jurisdictions.172 
Section B then delves into federal securities laws. Federal 
securities laws also regulate, to some extent, the duties of officers 
and directors of public companies. They primarily do so through 
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disclosure mandates, which indirectly impact conduct. Moreover, 
stock exchanges promulgate rules, some of which relate to the 
internal governance of listed companies. Section B considers those 
laws and rules that most directly relate to officers’ and directors’ 
strategic-management roles. 
A. State Law Mandates 
Directors and officers have an overarching duty to act in good 
faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interest 
of the corporation.173 This overarching duty is the foundation upon 
which fiduciary duties––the duty of loyalty and the duty of care––
exist.174 
This overarching duty is generally understood to have both a 
negative, as well as an affirmative, component. Namely, it has 
been interpreted as imposing a duty both to refrain from acting 
contrary to the interests of a corporation and to act affirmatively in 
a way that furthers the corporate purpose.175 As the Delaware 
Supreme Court held in the seminal case Guth v. Loft, Inc.,176 the 
director’s duty is “not only affirmatively to protect the interests of 
the corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from 
doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to 
                                                                                                             
 173. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). See 
also Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of 
Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 643 n.31 (2010) (identifying 
the Schnell case as the classic case standing for this proposition with respect to 
directors); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (2009). 
 174. See Strine, Jr., et al., supra note 173, at 634. 
 175. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also 
Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate 
Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 39–40 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, After Enron] 
(demonstrating that loyalty contains a minimum dimension, which precludes a 
director from personally benefitting from a transaction, as well as a maximum 
dimension, which requires that a director be affirmatively devoted to the 
corporate well-being); Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are There in 
Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1262–63 (2010) (arguing that the 
language in Guth, in which the Delaware Supreme Court indicated the 
affirmative and negative aspects of fiduciary duties, was general principles 
rather than part of the duty of loyalty); cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 cmt. 
1.A (2009) (quoting Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 
(Del. Ch. 1996)) (noting that bad faith is presented where the board authorizes a 
transaction for some purpose other than a genuine attempt to advance corporate 
welfare or is known to violate applicable positive law). 
 176. 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939). 




deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might 
properly bring to it.”177  
Still, this overarching duty does not set forth an enforceable 
standard. Rather, it is enforced through the more specifically 
formulated fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.178 The duty of care 
applies to officers and directors, both when they are making 
specific business decisions and when they are not.179 When officers 
and directors are making specific decisions, the duty of care 
demands that they become informed of all information reasonably 
available.180 The fiduciary must then make the decision exercising 
appropriate care.181 When they are not faced with a specific 
business decision, the duty of care demands that officers and 
directors pay attention to the firm committed to their charge.182 
This latter aspect of the duty of care is often referred to as the duty 
of oversight. 
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duty to become informed under the duty of care. See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 
259. 
 182. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
141(a) (Westlaw 2012). 




Strategic-management processes would seem to fall under the 
purview of the duty of oversight. That is because the question 
whether officers or directors must ensure that their firm has a 
strategic-management system in place is not a question of whether 
officers or directors became informed in connection with a specific 
strategic decision, but rather a question of whether they otherwise 
paid adequate attention to the firm’s strategic-management 
processes. Thus, the rest of this discussion focuses on the duty of 
oversight. First, subsection 1 looks at the legal duty itself. Then, 
subsection 2 applies that duty to the context of managing a firm’s 
strategy for wealth creation. 
1. Duty of Oversight 
The seminal case regarding the duty of oversight is In re 
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,183 decided by 
the Delaware Chancery Court in 1996. In that case, shareholders 
sought reimbursement from directors of $250 million that 
Caremark had paid in fines to federal regulators and to settle suits 
against it involving its violation of Anti-Referral Payment Laws.184 
Caremark and the defendant directors ultimately settled the 
derivative suit; however, under Delaware law, they were required 
to obtain the Chancery Court’s approval of the terms of 
settlement.185 
In his approval of the terms of settlement, former Chancellor 
Allen noted that the plaintiff’s case called into question the board’s 
duty of care, not in the context of making a business decision, but 
rather in the context of unconsidered inaction in the face of 
employee misconduct.186 A board has a duty in this latter context 
because, as the former Chancellor noted, business decisions of 
officers and employees deep in the interior of an organization can 
vitally affect the welfare of that organization and its ability to 
achieve its strategic and financial goals.187 Thus, former 
Chancellor Allen devoted the majority of his opinion to 
determining what duty a board has to assure itself that its 
corporation functions within the law to achieve its purpose so as to 
prevent a loss.188 
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a. Standard of Conduct 
 
According to the former Chancellor, a board has a duty to 
ensure that  
information and reporting systems exist in the organization 
that are reasonably designed to provide to senior 
management and to the board itself timely, accurate 
information sufficient to allow management and the board, 
each within its scope, to reach informed judgments 
concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and 
its business performance.189  
This replaced the standard from Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, where 
the court imposed no specific duty on directors to “root out 
misconduct.”190 
The Delaware courts have interpreted this standard in 
Caremark as a standard of conduct.191 This standard is intended to 
guide directors as to what is expected of them in supervising a 
firm, even though it does not necessarily articulate a standard for 
liability.192 
Neither the court in Caremark nor subsequent Delaware court 
decisions addressing the duty of oversight have clearly explained 
what business performance means under this normative standard. 
The absence of clarifying jurisprudence likely stems from the fact 
that the typical Caremark case involves a challenge to oversight 
over legal compliance systems or employee misconduct.193 In 
those types of cases, there is no need to explain what business 
performance means because the cases rest on those other aspects of 
the duty of oversight. In fact, according to former Chancellor 
Allen, his motivation behind the Caremark standard of conduct 
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was to “change directors’ behavior through its simple statement 
that directors have a duty to oversee legal compliance.”194 
More recently, plaintiff shareholders have alleged deficiencies 
in information and reporting systems relating to risks other than the 
risk of a violation of law. In one of the most significant such cases, 
In re Citigroup Shareholder Derivative Litigation, shareholder 
plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup suffered massive losses from its 
overexposure to risk in the subprime mortgage market.195 
According to the plaintiffs, those losses stemmed from Citigroup’s 
officers’ and board’s failure to assure that adequate and proper 
corporate information and reporting systems existed that would 
enable managers and the board to be fully informed regarding 
Citigroup’s risk related to the subprime mortgage market.196 In 
other words, the plaintiffs alleged a failure to oversee the 
implementation of an information and reporting system designed 
not to convey information about the risk of a violation of law, but 
rather credit risk. 
In Citigroup, the Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ complaint, characterizing the plaintiffs’ challenge as one 
which sought to hold “director defendants . . . personally liable to 
the Company because [in hindsight] they failed to fully recognize 
the risk posed by subprime securities.”197 While the court’s holding 
is discussed in further detail below, in connection with a discussion 
of the standard of liability, the important point to note here is that 
the Citigroup court’s analysis focused only on a duty to oversee 
information and reporting systems relating to risk––or as then-
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Chancellor Chandler called it, business risk.198 Thus, the court in 
Citigroup did not dictate any expectation on officers or directors in 
overseeing a corporation apart from the installation and 
implementation of systems to track risk.199 
b. Standard of Liability 
In terms of the standard of liability, Delaware courts have 
conceded that it is very difficult to establish oversight liability.200 
This reflects courts’ reluctance to second-guess managers’ 
activities, even in the context of unconsidered inaction. Thus, 
under the standard of oversight liability, most recently expressed 
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter, directors are 
only liable for breaching their duty of oversight where they “(a) . . . 
utterly failed to implement any reporting or information systems or 
controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus 
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems 
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Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 871–73 (2009). 
 200. See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 
362, 364 (Del. 2006); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505–06 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
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(“The theory here advanced is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation 
law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”). 




requiring their attention.”201 According to the court in that case, 
either of these failures reflects directors’ bad faith and thus 
amounts to a breach of the duty of loyalty.202 
The Citigroup decision, introduced above, reveals the 
Delaware courts’ reluctance to impose liability on directors for 
losses caused by lapses in oversight over “business risk,” over 
which a firm does not have control. According to the court in that 
case, holding directors liable for such lapses would undermine the 
well-settled policy in Delaware of avoiding hindsight evaluation.203 
This policy exists because it is almost impossible for a court to 
determine whether the directors of a company properly evaluated 
risk in making an investment decision, and doing so could cripple 
decision makers’ ability to earn returns by taking business risks.204 
Thus, the court in Citigroup was unwilling to hold directors 
responsible for oversight lapses absent misconduct or 
wrongdoing.205 
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 204. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126. See also Miller, supra note 18, at 98–
99 (arguing that it is absurd to think that a vice chancellor or chancellor on the 
Delaware Chancery Court could possibly decide what kinds of risk-
measurement models a financial firm should use, how they should be 
implemented, how they should be updated, how the proprietary data sets on 
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 205. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 130–31. The court did not, however, 
conclusively rule out liability for risk-management-oversight failures absent 
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c. Duty of Oversight of Officers 
Despite the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court has 
explicitly held that officers owe the same fiduciary duties as 
directors,206 no Delaware case has ever applied the duty of 
oversight to officers.207 Moreover, officers are thought of less as 
overseers and more as doers––or those individuals who make day-
to-day decisions under board supervision. Thus, it is questionable 
whether and how the duty of oversight applies to officers. 
Nevertheless, I believe that officers likely do––and ought to––
owe a duty of oversight similar to that of directors. That is because 
the same three bases for imposing such a duty on directors also 
apply to officers. 
First, according to former Chancellor Allen in Caremark, the 
duty of oversight derives in part from the seriousness with which 
                                                                                                             
 
not liable (e.g., In re Citigroup), and inadequate controls of insider wrongdoing, 
for which director may be liable (e.g., American International Group, Inc., 
Consolidated Derivative Litigation), arguing that this contributes to the 
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blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/03/08/another-perspective-on-citigroup-and-
aig/; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Consol. Derivative Litig., 965 A.2d 763, 799 (Del. Ch. 
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 207. In a recent case, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, 
applying Florida law, held that officers owe a duty of oversight like directors. 
See World Health Alternatives, Inc. v. McDonald, 385 B.R. 576, 591–92 
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775 So. 2d 387, 388 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). Language in Caremark also 
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Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The case [referring to 
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers] can be more narrowly interpreted as standing for the 
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behalf.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, Professor Martin Petrin has argued that 
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“individuals who execute the corporate mission” have a duty to “implement 
measures that will insure that violations [of law] will not occur,” appears to 
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Martin Petrin, The Curious Case of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability for 
Supervision and Management: Exploring the Intersection of Corporate and Tort 
Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1661, 1682 (2010) (quoting United States v. Park, 421 
U.S. 658, 672 (1975)). 




corporate law views the board’s role.208 Officers also perform an 
essential role in a business corporation’s operation. In fact, without 
officers, there would be no one to make important day-to-day 
operational decisions or to supervise the lower-level employees 
who keep a firm running. 
Secondly, according to former Chancellor Allen, the oversight 
duty derives from the “elementary fact that relevant and timely 
information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the board's 
supervisory and monitoring role under Section 141 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law.”209 If relevant and timely 
information is an essential predicate for satisfaction of the board’s 
supervisory and monitoring role, then officers, too, must have 
responsibility for ensuring that systems are in place to deliver 
relevant information to the board. In fact, the Delaware courts 
already impose a duty on officers to disclose to their superiors 
“material information relevant to the affairs of the agency 
entrusted to them.”210 While this duty only requires officers to 
inform their supervisors of information of which they are aware,211 
it would seem to undermine the board’s ability to supervise 
corporate affairs if directors only received information within 
officers’ knowledge. The information and reporting system that 
Caremark contemplates must not only be designed to bring 
relevant and timely information to the board––It must also bring 
relevant and timely information to managers, to allow them to 
make informed judgments. Thus, it would seem that officers must 
have a duty to establish an information and reporting system as a 
necessary predicate to the officers’ and their subordinate 
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managers’ abilities to fulfill their own respective management 
functions as well. 
Finally, as former Chancellor Allen noted, the duty of 
oversight derives from the need to install legal compliance systems 
to receive reduced sanctions under the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines.212 This rationale would also justify imposing a 
comparable duty of oversight on officers. In fact those guidelines 
specifically contemplate that “[h]igh-level personnel of the 
organization [will] ensure that the organization has an effective 
compliance and ethics program, as described in this guideline.”213 
While officers therefore likely have a duty of oversight similar 
to that of directors, given the more limited scope of officers’ 
responsibilities, an officer should only be required to oversee 
matters falling within her scope of authority.214 That is because it is 
difficult to imagine an officer being charged with ensuring that a 
comprehensive information and reporting system exists that is 
designed to transmit information of which she is not aware and 
would not need to know to discharge her function to officers to 
whom she is not accountable.215 
The same standard of liability applicable to directors would 
likely also apply to officers. That is because it is equally difficult 
for courts to assess in hindsight whether officers have effectively 
overseen their subordinate managers.216 Nevertheless, given 
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officers’ more engaged involvement in corporate affairs, it is 
probably easier to prove that officers knew or should have known 
of a control system deficiency that failed to bring to their or the 
board’s attention relevant information than it is to prove such 
deficiency by directors.217 
2. Duty of Oversight Applied to Strategic Management 
As Part II explained, directors oversee the formulation, 
implementation, monitoring, and revision of a firm’s strategic plan 
for the creation of value. Even where directors provide strategic 
advice to officers, they are also exercising oversight, for effective 
oversight means the ability to direct the person being overseen to 
modify her performance if she is not performing effectively.218 
While the board’s provision of strategic advice does not 
necessarily indicate that officers are not performing their strategic 
tasks effectively, it is consistent with the dialogical role between 
the overseer and the overseen. Thus, oversight duties apply to 
boards acting in their advisory role. 
Officers, too, supervise a firm’s strategic-management 
processes. That is because even though they are at the top of the 
management chain, they do not manage wealth-creating strategy 
alone. In fact, as I explained in Part II, given the predominance of 
the bottom-up structure of strategic management, lower level 
managers also make business decisions about strategy. Moreover, 
all employees throughout an enterprise are responsible for 
implementing strategy and for communicating changes in the 
factors underlying a firm’s strategic plan to strategic planners. 
Officers oversee these strategic-management efforts by their 
subordinates to ensure that employees are properly discharging 
these functions. For these reasons, and the reasons mentioned 
under the preceding Section, officers should––and likely do––also 
have a duty of oversight. 
As mentioned above, the duty of oversight generally requires 
that officers and directors pay attention to their firm to ensure that 
it functions within the law to achieve its purpose. Thus, the duty, at 
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least in its broadest sense, would seem to require that officers and 
directors ensure that a firm has a reasonable strategic-management 
process in place, for that process is what leads a firm to actually 
develop the purpose (i.e., objectives) to be achieved.219 
Furthermore, requiring oversight over strategic-management 
processes recognizes that employees deep within the interiors of a 
firm vitally affect not only the content of that firm’s strategic plan, 
but also its ability to achieve its objectives through its strategy. 
However, such a duty does not seem to exist either as a normative 
standard of conduct or a standard of liability. 
a. Standard of Conduct 
In terms of the standard of conduct for oversight, Caremark 
and its progeny create an expectation on officers and directors to 
implement systems designed to inform managers and the board 
about risks so that they can each make informed judgments. This 
expectation derives from the expectation that officers and directors 
will act in a firm’s best interest, even where they are not making 
specific business decisions. Therefore, the information transmitted 
to decision makers through such an information and reporting 
system helps them to become informed so that they can determine 
whether certain risks might necessitate responsive action to prevent 
losses in firm value. 
However, no Delaware court has clearly articulated any sort of 
expectation on officers or directors to oversee a system designed to 
inform them, or other managers, about drivers of firm strategy 
apart from risk to enable them to make appropriate judgments 
about the future direction of a firm’s business performance.220 That 
is true despite the fact that such a system, like an information and 
reporting system relating to risk, would also increase a firm’s 
value. It would do that through, for example, the reporting of 
information about a firm’s competitive strength, or a new 
opportunity for the creation of gains. Without such a clearly 
expressed standard of conduct, there is no legal normative 
guidance to officers or directors in favor of this kind of system. 
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Moreover, even if we assume that the duty of oversight 
included a duty to implement an information and reporting system 
relating to strategic information in addition to risk, such a standard 
would be incomplete. That is because the aspirational standard 
under Caremark appears to only call for the implementation of an 
informational system.221 However, processes through which 
strategy is formulated, implemented, and revised depend not 
merely on the functioning of systems to gather and transmit 
information but also on systems that control for conduct, such as 
controls on the kinds of new opportunities that managers can 
pursue in discharge of the firm’s strategy.222 This is especially true 
in the strategy-implementation stage, when a firm’s primary 
challenge is ensuring that employees at all levels are actually 
carrying out the marching orders laid out in the firm’s strategy. It 
is certainly foreseeable that employees will either fail to pursue the 
course of action called for by a firm’s strategy or pursue an 
opportunity not called for by that strategy, given the troubles that 
so many firms have encountered when carrying out this stage of 
strategic management. Yet, the expectation that officers and 
directors only implement information controls in overseeing a 
firm’s affairs would fail to capture these other types of conduct 
controls. 
b. Standard of Liability 
While it is perhaps a bit clearer in mandate, obviously the 
standard of liability under the duty of oversight is intended to be 
more limited in scope. More specifically, liability under the duty of 
oversight is premised only on the risk of a violation of law or 
employee misconduct.223 
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Moreover, liability is premised on the need to prove losses.224 
This means that even if the duty of oversight included information 
and reporting systems relating to strategy, such lapses might not 
give rise to liability, for strategic lapses often lead not to losses but 
to foregone gains. So, for instance, if a firm failed to install an 
information and reporting system relating to strategy, and, as a 
result, officers misidentified the source of a firm’s competitive 
advantage or were not aware of an additional opportunity, that 
failure would lead not to a loss but rather to a foregone gain.225 
Therefore, there would be no prospect of liability under the duty of 
oversight. 
The focus under the duty of oversight on preventing losses has 
likely thrown judges off the scent of the need to promulgate a clear 
expectation for directors and officers in overseeing their firms’ 
installation of wealth-creating processes. Specifically, because 
cases presented before those jurists involve challenged oversight 
lapses that led to losses, there is no need to address the demands of 
a broader duty of oversight for the creation of gains. However, the 
scope of a standard of conduct should not be limited by the context 
of cases brought before the courts. 
In sum, the duty of oversight only calls for oversight over 
certain processes--the gathering and reporting of information–
pertaining to certain aspects of a firm’s operations—its risks. It 
does not, however, clearly impose a duty on the board or officers, 
even as a normative standard, to oversee the management of 
strategy to create gains. 
B. Securities Laws Affecting Strategic-Management Duties 
Under a new SEC rule, public firms must disclose the extent of 
their board’s risk-management oversight role.226 Thus, under this 
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rule, firms must disclose whether the managers who are 
responsible for supervising risk-management report to the full 
board, the audit committee, or a risk committee.227 
This disclosure, while it does not impose a substantive 
requirement on boards to engage in risk management, surely 
suggests that boards must be doing something to oversee the 
management of risk. It even implies that managers will report to 
one of three possible board committees. This rule does not, 
however, call for disclosure about how risk is managed apart from 
the board oversight process. Thus, companies need not disclose 
their other internal risk-management processes or policies. 
Moreover, this rule does not call for the disclosure as to board 
oversight over the management of strategy. Thus, similar to state 
corporate law, the focus of the rule is on oversight over the process 
through which firms limit losses and not on the process through 
which firms create gains.  
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has also attempted to 
prod boards of listed companies into performing risk oversight. 
Specifically, the NYSE’s corporate governance rules require the 
audit committee of a listed corporation to have a charter that sets 
out the audit committee’s duties and responsibilities with respect to 
discussing risk-management policies.228 Even where the audit 
committee is not the sole body responsible for overseeing the 
management of risk, under these rules, it must discuss guidelines 
and policies to govern the process by which risk management is 
undertaken.229  
This mandate, perhaps even more so than the SEC rule 
discussed above, is designed to bring about more board 
engagement in the risk-management process. It does so through 
encouraging more communication within the audit committee 
about risk-management processes. However, like the SEC rule, it 
too ignores processes to bring about more effective management of 
strategy apart from promoting better awareness on the audit 
committee as to the board’s role in overseeing the management of 
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risk. Thus, the NYSE mandate, like the SEC rule, seems designed 
to prompt companies to enhance their processes to manage risk to 
avoid losses, but not also to enhance their processes to manage 
strategy to create gains. 
C. Conclusion 
As the preceding discussion reveals, corporate law does not 
specify any clear standards for officers or directors, either as an 
aspirational standard of conduct or standard of liability, to oversee 
the implementation of processes to manage strategy to create gains. 
Securities regulations and stock exchange rules also ignore the 
management of strategy and primarily seek to cause boards to be 
more involved in overseeing the management of risk. While these 
legal standards are designed to encourage firms to improve the 
processes through which they limit their losses from risks so that 
they can create sustained value, these legal standards do not take a 
similar approach to the corollary process through which firms 
actually create value––that is, the management of strategy. 
The next section explores why the law’s failure to mandate 
oversight over the management of strategy apart from risk is 
problematic and what should be done to address it. 
IV. CREATING A STRATEGIC-MANAGEMENT NORM THROUGH 
CORPORATE LAW 
A. Making a Case for Change 
As Part II showed, managing strategy is a multifaceted, 
multilayered process, integrated with the management of risk, all 
of which is designed to generate value.230 Despite that, judges, 
policymakers, and commentators have focused their attention only 
on the creation of value through better risk-management processes 
and ignored the creation of value through strategic-management 
processes. 
Clearly, there are good reasons why state courts should be 
reluctant to hold officers and directors accountable for the strategic 
decisions that they make that turn out badly. Most notably, 
business necessarily involves uncertainty that planners simply 
cannot foresee, much less plan for, and to hold them accountable 
for the adverse consequences of such uncertainty could cause them 
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to be too cautious when selecting a strategy. But that does not 
mean courts cannot or should not demand that officers and 
directors put in place reasonable systems designed to inform them 
and other managers of information relevant to the firm’s wealth-
creating strategic processes and to implement controls designed to 
ensure those strategies are effectively implemented. In fact, 
Caremark illustrates that while the details of a system can be left to 
the boards’ and officers’ discretion, the law can at least mandate 
the adoption of a minimally effective system. 
Nor is the fact that managers have incentives to create value an 
adequate response to why courts should decline to set out standards 
relating to strategic management for the creation of gains. While 
officers would ideally be compensated for effectively managing 
strategy to create gains, the reality is that it is hard to design a 
compensation package that effectively does so given that some 
objectives are qualitative and thus difficult to measure.231 
Moreover, as Professor David Walker has argued, there is a lack of 
understanding of which compensation instruments best link pay to 
long-term performance.232 To the extent that financial incentives 
alone cannot create a managerial drive toward achieving the 
creation of gains through strategic management, the law should 
pick up the slack, at a minimum, through an expressive standard of 
conduct. 
The SEC’s disclosure rules and the NYSE’s corporate 
governance rules also focus solely on board oversight over the 
management of risk, neglecting to address the board’s and officers’ 
role in overseeing the management of strategy for the creation of 
gains.233 While the SEC’s and NYSE’s goal of protecting 
investors234 might bespeak a need to have firms educate those 
investors on risks that can lead to losses, surely investors are not 
protected if the boards and officers of the firms in which they 
invest do not also have a clear directive on their responsibility to 
oversee the implementation of processes to create gains. 
There is also a dearth of discussions in the academic literature 
as to the management of strategy. In fact, in the past three years, 
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commentators have put forth numerous proposals for improved 
risk-management processes.235 Yet, none of those commentators 
discuss in any meaningful way how managing strategy relates to 
the management of risk or the need to encourage or require firms 
to more effectively manage the former in addition to the latter. 
Admittedly, many of those commentators make a good case for 
how improving the management of risk can enhance a firm’s 
value.236 However, that argument alone does not drive firms to 
more effectively manage their strategies to create value. 
In one recent article, Professor Eric Pan provides some insight 
into the strategic context for risk management.237 For instance, 
according to Professor Pan, boards monitor officers by collecting 
and evaluating information about officers’ performance and the 
effectiveness of corporate strategy.238 Professor Pan also states that 
boards offer advice concerning (or, if necessary, dictate) corporate 
strategy.239 According to Professor Pan, these two roles are 
inseparable, for a board cannot fulfill its monitoring role without 
the ability to affect corporate strategy and respond to negative 
developments.240 Likewise, a board cannot carry out its managerial 
role without first collecting information about corporate operations 
through its monitoring activities.241 
Despite his discussion of the board’s strategic role, Professor 
Pan’s proposal focuses only on expanding the scope of risks for 
which the board’s duty of oversight applies.242 He focuses only on 
risk because he believes that is the context in which there is the 
greatest concern about officers’ ability to protect shareholders’ 
interests.243 However, as I have demonstrated in Part II, firms often 
fail not merely because they do not adequately manage their risks 
but because they fail to create strategic plans for the creation of 
gains or fail to implement those plans. Thus, if we want to 
encourage firms to create long-term value, we should not only 
charge the board and officers with oversight over the management 
of risk but also with oversight of the processes through which they 
generate returns. Focusing legal standards only on the creation of 
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value by managing risks, and not the corollary process of 
managing strategy, creates a number of risks. 
First, such legal focus on risk-management practices could 
drive managers to focus on, not surprisingly, limiting losses 
through the management of risk at the expense of focusing on 
managing strategies for growth. In fact, according to Professor 
David Larcker, affiliated with the Corporate Governance Research 
Program at the Stanford School of Business, a check-the-box 
mentality associated with compliance is drowning out strategy.244 
Even the NYSE, in a 2010 Report issued by its Commission on 
Corporate Governance, cautioned that new governance mandates 
and “best practice” recommendations over the last decade create a 
risk that even the best boards will adopt a check-the-box mentality 
rather than have corporate governance serve an integrated role in a 
company’s strategy.245 One sign that firms may be ignoring the 
management of strategy is the conclusion by numerous business 
commentators that firms often fail to either monitor the 
implementation of their strategies or fail to revise their strategies in 
response to change.246 
While the bulk of the concern that compliance is drowning out 
strategy likely stems from the numerous SEC mandates on risk 
management, surely the problem is compounded where corporate 
law jurists and commentators focus narrowly on creating or 
proposing new mandates as to risk management without giving any 
clear sense for its strategic context or any imperative to perform 
the latter as well. This would also seem to influence the SEC’s 
view of the role and duties of the board and officers, for the SEC 
looks to state law for such matters in crafting its disclosure rules.247 
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Thus, SEC regulations focusing on risk management may simply 
reflect what the SEC views as the state law role of boards. 
Second, legal standards specifying how firms should or must 
manage risk to limit their losses might lead those firms to institute 
a disjointed process whereby they manage risks in one way to suit 
these legal requirements and manage their wealth-creating strategy 
entirely separately, without regard to such constraints. Yet, 
implementing such a disjointed process does not make sense given 
the integral connection between risk and strategy, both of which 
create value for a firm. In fact, implementing such a bifurcated 
process might actually impair ERM efforts, which promote the 
management of risk in a way that furthers the setting of firm 
objectives.248 
For example, one outgrowth of the post-financial crisis risk-
management fury is the creation by some firms of separate risk 
committees of the board.249 In fact, the Shareholder Bill of Rights 
of 2009, which was a predecessor to the Dodd–Frank Act and 
introduced by Senator Charles Schumer, would have required that 
all public companies form risk committees of the board 
“responsible for establishing and evaluating the firm’s risk-
management practices.”250 While a risk committee generally 
oversees the determination of a firm’s risk appetite and tolerance, 
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as well as the processes the firm uses to manage its risk,251 it is 
typically not responsible for general strategic oversight––that 
remains a function of the full board.252 
Though it may make sense for certain firms to have separate 
risk committees, for other firms, such a committee would prevent 
the full board from understanding the risks attendant to the firm’s 
strategy.253 In fact, according to a survey conducted by the 
Conference Board, many of the responding directors indicated that 
they thought risk oversight should be a function of the full board 
because it is so integrally linked to strategy oversight.254 By 
stripping risk oversight from the full board’s domain, some boards 
might be less effective at overseeing their firm’s management of 
strategy to create gains.255 
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Additionally, short-termism may have derived in part from the 
absence of reinforcing mandates as to the wealth-creating aspects 
of strategic planning. Specifically, as discussed in Part II.B above, 
short-termism is the undue focus by a firm on short-term revenues 
rather than the long-term creation of value. A firm that does not 
have realistic long-term objectives or a strategy in place to achieve 
those objectives would not be able to provide its employees with 
guidance in making decisions designed to achieve that strategic 
plan. Without such a guide, they tend to make decisions with a 
focus solely on producing short-term revenues.256 Thus, failing to 
have an effective strategic plan in place contributes to the short-
termism problem that Professors Lynne Dallas, David Walker, I, 
and others have identified and have put forth other proposals to 
address.257 
Even if we assume that managers currently manage their firms’ 
strategies effectively, there is no reason why the law should not 
impose a duty on managers to do this. In fact, a normative standard 
might be useful even to the most strategically minded managers, 
who might be faced with situations and pressures that are 
inconsistent with the objectives of long-term value creation. 
Moreover, without a clear statement on what is expected of 
officers and directors in terms of strategic management, those 
norms might shift or erode over time.  
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B. Promoting Strategic Management Through Fiduciary Duties 
State corporate law regulates the internal affairs of 
corporations.258 That includes setting out the powers and duties of 
shareholders, directors, and officers.259 
State corporate law regulates through standards rather than 
rules.260 There are several justifications for this approach. For one, 
standards are much more flexible than rules.261 They are therefore 
thought to be more appropriate in the corporate setting, where no 
two corporations, corporate managers, or corporate contexts are 
alike.262 
Moreover, standards are typically generated and articulated 
through stories told by courts.263 Thus, they have a narrative 
quality that is not shared by rules.264 In the case of corporate law, 
this is beneficial because, as Professor Edward Rock has argued, 
one of the true benefits of corporate law is that it provides a set of 
tales of good and bad managers that fills out the “normative job 
description of these critical players.”265 Thus, it is not necessarily 
the purpose of corporate law to sanction managers but rather to 
provide a set of normative standards with which managers try to 
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comply because they believe doing a good job is the right thing to 
do.266 That is especially important for directors, who often are 
wealthy, well-reputed business people otherwise protected by 
insurance. Thus, shame and reputational damage might be a more 
effective disciplining mechanism than monetary damages.267 
That is not to say that state corporate law serves only a 
normative function. It also does, in some cases, provide a source of 
monetary liability or injunctive relief. Yet, the primary function of 
state corporate law, especially outside of the takeover context in 
the absence of self-dealing, seems to be to set forth the normative 
standards that directors and officers are expected to follow to be 
responsible corporate citizens. 
Given all of these attributes of state corporate law, I believe 
that it is the appropriate medium through which to specify a 
strategic oversight duty on officers and directors. In particular, its 
flexibility is indispensable in setting out a standard for engaging in 
a process that simply cannot (and should not) be standardized. 
Moreover, its normative quality would allow courts to specify what 
is expected of directors and officers in terms of processes to ensure 
strategy is being effectively managed without requiring courts to 
pass on the merits of any particular strategy. Importantly, it would 
give managers a more complete normative picture of what is 
expected of them in terms of managing the creation of value 
beyond managing risk of loss. 
To reflect the foregoing, I propose that Delaware courts clarify 
that the duty of oversight demands that officers and directors 
oversee the implementation of systems to inform them and other 
strategic managers of information relevant to the management of 
strategy in addition to risk. This clarification could come in the 
form of a clarification of the term business performance under the 
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duty of oversight. Thus, under the duty of oversight, officers and 
directors would have a duty to design and implement information 
and reporting systems to communicate information about 
competitive advantage and weaknesses; resources, competitors, 
and other constraints; and risks and opportunities to appropriate 
strategic managers so that they can more effectively manage 
strategy to create gains.  
Clarifying that business performance includes the nonrisk 
components of strategy would show that officers and directors 
must oversee the implementation, not only of systems to prevent 
losses, but also of systems to create gains, for all of those dictate a 
firm’s business performance.  
Moreover, Delaware courts should clearly indicate that the 
duty of oversight applies not only to information and reporting 
systems but to all systems designed to ensure effective 
management of strategy. Again, this would reflect the fact that 
managing strategy is not only about the reporting of information 
but also about the installation of conduct controls designed to 
ensure the strategy is actually implemented. Given the numerous 
instances of corporate collapse due to ineffective strategy 
implementation, it would seem that normative standards relating to 
business oversight should encompass oversight of these critical 
systems rather than just information.  
These clarifications would take the form of normative 
standards of conduct. In other words, I do not propose holding 
officers or directors liable for failing to implement these standards. 
That is because for the same reasons mentioned by former 
Chancellor Chandler in Citigroup, it is difficult to envision how 
courts could determine after-the-fact whether a firm’s failure to 
achieve its objectives resulted from a flawed process or simply 
unforeseen risk. However, my proposal would provide officers and 
directors with a much-needed narrative of what is expected of them 
in overseeing a firm’s ongoing operations apart from the present 
ambiguous standard that seems to relate only to risk. This narrative 
would, in Professor Rock’s parlance, fill out the “normative job 
description” for these critical corporate players as to this critical 
strategic function. 
Hopefully the manifestation of a clear norm on engaging in 
strategic management would encourage directors and officers to in 
fact implement more effective processes for the creation of gains. 
Thus, officers and directors could correct any strategic-
management practices that fall below what is expected of them. It 
also would demonstrate courts’ understanding of the context for 
the management of risk, and the relationship between risk and 
strategy, that currently seem to be lacking. Also, setting out a clear 




standard of conduct on the management of strategy would give 
courts the appropriate vocabulary and concepts to explain why 
business involves risk. And establishing such a clear norm could 
serve as an additional force in the battle against the pressures to 
create short-term value, for it would reinforce the need to create 
and implement long-term strategic plans to guide employee 
decisions, replacing the short-term earnings guidance on which 
they would otherwise rely.268 
In addition, shareholders could utilize this normative standard 
to discipline errant officers and boards, perhaps by not voting in 
favor of a board that fails to meet the pronounced expectation for 
strategic management. They could also commence a derivative suit 
against any officer or a board that failed to perform its expected 
strategic-management role, arguing such conduct amounts to bad 
faith.269 Although the duty of oversight would not presently appear 
to capture such misconduct, the existence of a clear standard of 
conduct could give rise to a perceived need for liability for failures 
to conform to such expectation. 
While pronouncing such a standard in the context of judge-
made law requires the right case to come before the judiciary, I am 
fairly confident that Delaware courts will have ample opportunity 
to issue this kind of guidance in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
in future cases involving challenges to “excessive” risk taking. 
That is because strategic management is the corollary of risk 
management, and thus a case that intends to capture the full spirit 
of the duty of oversight would need to address not only what it 
requires in terms of loss-preventing processes but also gain-
creating processes. Delaware jurists could also put on their 
commentator hats, as they often do, to give this kind of guidance 
even before an appropriate case comes before the courts. 
Finally, implementing this suggestion would require courts to 
clarify that officers and directors are to primarily act in a firm’s 
long-term best interest. That is because only if officers and 
directors have a duty to look long term can they be expected to 
implement and oversee processes by which long-term value is 
created. Yet, as I argued in another article, corporate law currently 
does not require that directors (or officers) take such a long-term 
perspective.270 Mandating such a long-term focus would not only 
drive officers and directors to focus on ensuring that their firms 
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have processes to guide their creation of long-term value but would 
also serve as yet another force to combat the myriad pressures on 
managers to manage for the short term. 
This proposal would not only establish clearer standards as to 
board and officer conduct in overseeing strategy but would also 
provide cues to policymakers and courts of other jurisdictions as to 
what officers and directors should be doing with respect to the 
management of wealth-creation strategies. In fact, courts of other 
jurisdictions often look to Delaware courts for guidance in 
establishing their own fiduciary duty law.271 That may be 
increasingly the case as courts in jurisdictions outside of Delaware 
decide more and more cases under Delaware corporate law.272 
Thus, those other forums may follow Delaware’s lead and be more 
cognizant of the need for managers to not only manage risk but 
also strategy, all to create value. 
I do not anticipate that this proposal will transform businesses 
into effective long-term managing machines. But, it is intended to 
give business leaders the legal foundation, support, and urging that 
they may need to focus their attention on the critical processes 
through which their firms create value apart from limiting their 
losses through the management of risk. Yet, I can already 
anticipate a number of critiques to my proposal. 
First, some critics might argue that Delaware law already 
reflects these expectations on directors and officers. That is 
because Delaware law already expects directors and officers to 
implement “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate governance 
practices” for they often benefit stockholders, sometimes reduce 
litigation, and can usually help directors avoid liability.273 
Moreover, it already obligates them to act in a manner that 
affirmatively is in the corporation’s best interest.274 Together, these 
could be interpreted to mean that officers and directors should 
oversee strategic management, for that is good corporate 
governance practice and the way firms create value. 
My response to this argument is that such a standard is too 
broad and generalized to be of much use to officers or directors. 
Such a standard, for example, might simply mean that officers and 
directors should not act in their own personal interest. Or it may 
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mean that they should ensure that risks that can lead to losses are 
managed because those risks deprive a firm of value. In any event, 
it should not be a mystery that officers and directors should 
manage a firm to affirmatively create sustained value and that they 
should do so not only through limiting losses through risk-
management processes but also by creating gains through strategic-
management processes. 
This is especially true because the Delaware courts have hinted 
at a normative standard in the oversight context of installing 
information systems to inform directors and managers of business 
performance. Yet, the ambiguity associated with the term business 
performance fails to clearly signal to directors and officers what is 
in fact expected of them, and courts’ discussions only of risk in 
applying this principle compound this ambiguity. 
In sum, given the relative dearth of judicial discussions 
concerning strategic management apart from risk, it is hard to 
determine a best practice for that process from existing fiduciary 
duty law. 
Second, some commentators might argue that state law does 
not need to set a normative standard for the management of 
strategy, for the free market ensures that they will manage in this 
fashion if it truly creates value. According to this line of reasoning, 
officers already have financial incentives––in the form of stock 
options and other kinds of incentive compensation––to create value 
and thus to implement processes to achieve that end. Shareholders, 
too, want a firm to create value because shareholders are the 
residual beneficiaries of such value.275 Thus, they, too, can be 
expected to behave in a way that drives a firm to create value on its 
own, without needing regulatory interference.  
There are a number of flaws in this argument. First, current 
compensation practices often motivate officers to generate value 
over the short term.276 In fact, those compensation practices are 
one of the primary drivers of managers’ excessive risk taking, for 
their compensation is typically not reduced by losses that 
materialize in the future, when risky future events unfold. 
Similarly, those compensation practices do not motivate officers to 
create true value through long-term strategic developments, again, 
because that value is only realized over time.277 As such, incentive 
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compensation does not always encourage strategic management of 
a firm for the creation of true (rather than short-term) value. 
Plus, there is some evidence that managing strategy might be 
costly in the short term.278 Yet, true value is often only realized in 
the future, when strategic initiatives have a chance to play out and 
create gains for a firm. Given the tendency for firms to focus on 
short-term results rather than long-term value, long-term strategic 
management is undoubtedly compromised. 
Moreover, this argument ignores the expressive function of 
fiduciary duties, which is designed to encourage socially desirable 
conduct. It is hard to imagine conduct that is more socially desirable 
than the formulation and implementation of plans for the creation of 
durable wealth. President Obama recognized this when he called on 
the U.S. to resume its role as a leader in innovation to improve our 
livelihoods.279 While innovation does not only take place in the U.S. 
in for-profit corporations, most of it does. To be an effective 
innovator, a business needs to create and implement a well thought-
out plan for the creation of gains. It cannot simply create durable 
wealth through innovation by wisely managing its risks. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have proposed that Delaware courts clarify 
existing fiduciary duties to reflect the broader roles and 
responsibilities of officers and directors in managing strategy. 
Effectuating this change is important because it would more 
completely reflect directors’ and officers’ true strategic functions, 
rather than simply their risk-management functions. Importantly, 
this change would also give the key corporate players a legal 
infrastructure to support their engagement in the process designed 
not merely to limit losses but also to create sustained value through 
wealth-creating strategic management. That, in turn, could benefit 
firms, their shareholders, other corporate constituents, and society. 
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